FTR#562—Miscellaneous Articles and Updates—(Two 30-minute segments)
(Sources are noted in parentheses.) (Recorded on 7/23/2006.)
Note: FTR#’s 260-316, 317,
324, FTR#325 and succeeding programs are streaming
on Real Audio at www.wfmu.org/daveemory.
FTR#’s 01-270, 316-324 are available for download
only, also on Real Audio, on their Archive Page.)
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NOTE: TWO
LECTURES PRESENTING MR. EMORY’S VIEWS OF WHAT WE CAN EXPECT IN THE FUTURE ARE
NOW AVAILABLE FOR DOWLOAD FOR FREE IN
BOTH REAL AUDIO AND MP3. These lectures are:
L-1: ‘The Political Implications of the UFO Phenomenon and the ‘ET’ Myth’; and
L-2: ‘The Future--Technology, Theocracy and the Thousand-Year-Reich.’
Descriptions are available in the Lecture Series section.
NEW!! A number of
vitally important books are now available for download for FREE. The books are:
Martin Bormann: Nazi in
Exile by Paul Manning; The Nazis Go Underground
by Curt Reiss; and All Honorable Men (parts 1 and 2) by James
Stewart Martin. Taken together, these books will provide a significant
understanding of the concept and reality of The Underground Reich, and they can
be downloaded with a modem Internet connection. They are available at: Spitfirelist.com/Books. In addition, we have added Cairo to Damascus by John Roy Carlson [1951], Germany Plots with the Kremlin by T.H. Tetens [1953], and Armies of Spies by Joseph Golomb [1939].
Yet another recent addition is Germany’s
Master Plan by Joseph Borkin and Charles Welsh. (Borkin is the author of
the 1979 classic The Crime and Punishment
of I.G. Farben.) Another anti-fascist classic about I.G. Farben supplements
the Borkin and Welsh text—Treason’s Peace
by Howard Watson Ambruster. Two more recently-posted gems are The Thousand-Year Conspiracy by Paul
Winkler and Falange by Alan Chase,
both published in 1943. The Winkler text documents the evolution of militant
Pan-Germanism from the Teutonic Knights to the Nazis and Falange documents the Third Reich’s geopolitical goals in the
Spanish-speaking world. By the time many of you read this description, more of
the long-out-of-print anti-fascist books that are more than 50 years old will
have been added to the Spitfirelist.com/Books URL. The Manning text’s URL also features a discussion of
Paul Manning’s career and professional credentials. Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile is also available in html. Note also that FTR#305
has a synoptic overview of the Bormann organization. An understanding of the
Bormann organization is essential for an in-depth grasp of the arguments
presented on For The Record.
Note also that U.S. Government documents proving Prescott
Bush Sr.’s Money-Laundering on behalf of the Third Reich before and after World
War II are available at a linked website, along with commentary by John
Buchanan, who located the documentation. This material is discussed in FTR#435.
The website containing the documents is www.debatecomics.org/BushFamilyFortune/.
Summary of FTR#562—(Note: The massive
volume of ‘For The Record’ programs about 9/11 and related topics is summarized
and analyzed in the periodically-updated description for FTR#391.
FTR#’s 454,
455, 456 are compilations of
much of the key documentation culled from Mr. Emory’s investigation into 9/11.
Along with FTR#391, they should give
listeners/readers a substantive grasp of this momentous event. It is
recommended that listeners use this description and e-mail it to others.) Beginning with discussion of
the possibility of a military coup in the United States, the program features a
panel discussion of experts invited to discuss the topic in an article in
“Harper’s.” In this article, the panelists explore a number of ways in which
military influence in society has been, and is, expanding—thus affording the
military an avenue for affecting political matters that is less drastic than a
coup. They analyze the possibility that a terrorist incident featuring the use
of a weapon of mass destruction might result in an assumption of power by the
military. Significantly, they discuss a “creeping coup” that stems, in most of
their opinion, from the cold war and, above all, the Bush administration’s
unceasing emphasis on war. The broadcast also explores the leasing of state
highways to foreign companies—a hallmark of this country’s economic distress.
Concluding with discussion of an attempt on the life of Harry Truman by Puerto
Rican nationalists, the broadcast notes that the would-be assassins were
members of a fascist group.
Program Highlights Include: Discussion of the demographics of military
recruitment and their influence on the civilian/military balance; a recounting
of past conflicts between the civilian and military sectors of society;
analysis of the profound conflict between the Clinton administration and the
military; analysis of Puerto Rican fascists’ historical alliance with the
Falange, based in Franco’s Spain and allied with Nazi Germany.
1.
The program begins with introduction of the panelists in the
discussion: “Eternal vigilance being the price of
liberty, Americans—who spent decades war-gaming a Soviet invasion and have
taken more recently to daydreaming about “ticking bomb” scenarios—should cast
at least an occasional thought toward the only truly existential threat that
American democracy might face today. We now live in a unipolar world, after
all, in which conquest of the United States by an outside power is nearly
inconceivable. Even the best-equipped terrorists, for their part, could
dispatch at most a city or two; and armed revolution is a futile prospect, so
fearsomely is our homeland secured by police and military forces. To subdue America
entirely, the only route remaining would be to seize the machinery of state
itself, to steer it toward malign ends—to carry out, that is, a coup d’état.
Given that the linchpin of any coup d’état is the participation, or at least
the support, of a nation’s military officers, Harper’s Magazine
assembled a panel of experts to discuss the state of our own military—its
culture, its relationship with the wider society, and the steadfastness of its
loyalty to the ideals of democracy and to the United States Constitution. The
following forum is based on a discussion that took place in January at the
Ruth’s Chris Steak House in Arlington, Virginia. Bill Wasik served as
moderator.” (“American Coup d’Etat”; Harper’s Magazine;
April/2006; pp. 43-44.)
2.
“ANDREW J. BACEVICH is a professor of international
relations at Boston University and the author, most recently, of The New
American Militarism. He served as an officer in the U.S. Army from 1969 to
1992. BRIG. GEN. CHARLES J. DUNLAP JR. is a staff judge advocate at Langley
Air Force Base in Virginia. In 1992 he published an essay entitled “The Origins
of the American Military Coup of 2012.” [His article forms the principal
element in FTR#74.] (His
views here are personal and do not reflect those of the U.S. Department of
Defense.) RICHARD H. KOHN is the chair of the curriculum in Peace, War, and
Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and editor of the
book The United States Military Under the Constitution of the United States,
1789-1989, among others. EDWARD N. LUTTWAK is a senior adviser at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the author of many
books, including Coup D’Etat: A Practical Handbook. BILL WASIK is a
senior editor of Harper’s Magazine.” (Ibid.; p. 44.)
3.
Beginning with the fundamental focal point of discussion, the panelists
are in agreement that an overt military coup in the United States would not be
possible. In this context, it is important to note that, as Mr. Emory notes
in the program, the panelists do not take account of events such as the
assassination of President Kennedy, a successful coup. When the media are
controlled, and in this country they are and have been for some time, anything
is possible. Note also that the panelists do not discuss the coup attempt of
1934. [For more about the coup attempt of 1934, see—among other programs—FTR#’s 448, 475, 481.] “BILL WASIK: Let us begin with the most straightforward
approach. Would it be possible for a renegade group of military officers, or
the officer corps as a whole, to simply plot and carry out a coup d’état in the
United States? EDWARD LUTTWAK: If somebody
asked me to plan such a coup, I wouldn’t take on the assignment. CHARLES DUNLAP: I wouldn’t either. [Laughs] LUTTWAK: I’ve done it for other countries. But it just
wouldn’t work here. You could go down the list and take over these
headquarters, that headquarters, the White House, the Defense Department, the
television, the radio, and so on. You could arrest all the leaders, detain or
kill off their families. And you would have accomplished nothing. ANDREW BACEVICH: That’s right. What are you going to seize
that, having seized it, gives you control of the country?” (Idem.)
4.
“LUTTWAK: You would sit in the office of the Secretary of
Defense, and the first place where you wouldn’t be obeyed would be inside your
office. If they did follow orders inside the office, then people in the rest of
the Pentagon wouldn’t. If everybody in the Pentagon followed orders, people out
in the military bases wouldn’t. If they did, as well, American citizens would
still not accept your legitimacy. RICHARD KOHN: It’s a problem of public
opinion. All of the organs of opinion in this country would rise up with one
voice: the courts, the media, business leaders, education leaders, the clergy. LUTTWAK: You
could shut down the media—KOHN: You can’t shut it down. It’s too
dispersed. LUTTWAK: No, you could shut down the media, but even if you did
shut down the media, you still wouldn’t be able to rule. Because, remember, in
order to actually rule, you have to have acceptance. Think of Saddam Hussein:
he was not a very, you know, popular leader, but he did have to be
obeyed at the very minimum by his security forces, his Republican Guards. So
there is a minimum group that one needs in order to control any country. But in
this country, you could never control such a minimum group.” (Idem.)
5.
“KOHN: I’ve raised this point before with military
audiences: Do you really think you can control New York City without the
cooperation of 40,000 New York police officers? And what about Idaho, with all
those militia groups? Do you think you can control Idaho? I’m not even going to
talk about Texas. BACEVICH: And this comes back to the federal system. As
Edward pointed out, even if you seized Washington, Americans are willing to
acknowledge that Washington is the seat of political authority only to a
limited extent. The coup plotters could sit in the Capitol, but up in Boston
we’re going to ask, ‘What’s this got to do with us?’” (Idem.)
6.
“DUNLAP: It’s also impossible given the culture of the
military. The notion of a cabal of U.S. military officers colluding to
overthrow the government is almost unthinkable. Civilian control of the
military is too deeply ingrained in the armed forces. BACEVICH: The
professional ethic within the military is firmly committed to the principle
that they don’t rule. WASIK: So we can agree, then, that the blunt approach won’t
work. Was there ever a time in our history when the United States was in danger
of an outright military takeover?” (Idem.)
7.
The panelists discuss a number of incidents of subordination within the
military, ranging from the immediate aftermath of the American Revolution until
the period just after the American Civil War. “KOHN:
The closest, I would say, was a faction in the military at Newburgh, New York,
in March of 1783. The army felt like it was about to be abandoned in the
oncoming peace; officers were concerned about their reintegration into American
society, that they wouldn’t get the pay that had been promised them. They got
caught up in a very complex plot, in which they were used by a faction in the
Congress that was trying to change the Articles of Confederation to give the
central government the power to tax. Nationalist leaders in Congress basically
provoked a coup attempt and then double-crossed the officers that they induced
to do it by tipping off George Washington. All this led to a famous meeting of
the officers when it was proposed that they see to their own interests, and
either march on the Congress or, if the war continued, retire to the West and
abandon the country. Washington faced down the conspirators in an emotional
moment at Newburgh on March 15, 1783.” (Ibid.; p. 45)
8.
“DUNLAP: He was reading a letter from a
congressman, as I recall, and then at one point he said, ‘Gentlemen, you will permit
me to put on my spectacles. For I have not only grown gray but almost blind in
the service of my country.’ KOHN: And this
caused a kind of emotional break at the meeting, according to the people who
were there. DUNLAP: Because they realized how
much he had sacrificed. And it humiliated them. LUTTWAK:
So the point here is to make sure your army has excellent retirement benefits.
This was an industrial action. It was about getting paid. KOHN: The pay represented a lot more than just the money,
though. There was deep political intrigue involved, and personal animosity. LUTTWAK: In other words, the republic was in great danger
in 1783. Which doesn’t cause immediate alarm these days in the streets of
Manhattan.” (Idem.)
9.
Introducing a central element of analysis, the panelists explore the
fact that the military has learned to perform in the political arena. “BACEVICH: But this does bring up another crucial reason
there could never be a military coup in the United States: the military has
learned to play politics. It doesn’t need to have a coup in order to get what
it wants most of the time. Especially since World War II, the services have
become very skillful at exploiting the media and at manipulating the
Congress—particularly on the defense budget, which is estimated now to be equal
to that of the entire rest of the world combined. DUNLAP: I agree, though I wouldn’t characterize it
negatively. The military works within the system to achieve its needs. LUTTWAK: A few years back, the president of Argentina told
the country’s air force that its budget for the next year would be $80 million.
Now, Argentina has a fairly large air force; $80 million was enough for one
base, basically. But the air force had no recourse, no back channels to
Congress, no talk shows to go on. That could never happen in the United States.
BACEVICH: Right. Our military doesn’t need to
overthrow the government, because it has learned how to play politics in order
to achieve its interests. (Idem.)
10.
The panelists do note the possibility that an attack with weapons of
mass destruction might trigger a series of events that could lead to an
assumption of extra constitutional authority by the military. The possibility
that elements that might seek power could precipitate such a set of circumstances
is one to be carefully considered. “WASIK: Are
there any unforeseen circumstances in which a coup might become possible
in the United States? KOHN: One could
conceive of situations in which the military would be invited to exercise
extraconstitutional authority. Imagine rolling biological attacks, with the
need to quarantine whole cities or regions. A military takeover might arise,
indeed, from a politician wanting to simply retain order in the country. It
might be supported by the American people—and Congress and the courts might go
along. LUTTWAK: Such a scenario would probably
play out through a multi-stage transformation. After all, take any group of
nice people on a trip; if five bad things happen to them in a row, they will
end up as cannibals. How many adverse events are needed before a political
system, arguably the most firmly rooted constitutional system in the history of
the world, becomes uprooted? How many September 11ths, on what scale? How much
panic, what kind of leadership? All of us can say that it is foolish to talk of
a coup in the United States, but any of us could design a scenario by which a
coup becomes possible. DUNLAP: If there were a
massive attack by a nuclear weapon, or by some other weapon of mass
destruction, the immediate crisis might require the use of the armed forces.
But obviously there are plans for those scenarios, and if they’re executed,
then control would be maintained under the Constitution.” (Ibid.;
pp. 45-46.)
11.
Among the scenarios envisioned by the panelists would be a
constitutional crisis precipitated by a fundamental disagreement by the duly
appointed branches of civilian government. “BACEVICH:
But these are scenarios in which the military would be invited to overstep its
role. KOHN: Yes. I cannot conceive that in such
a situation the military would aggrandize its position on its own. WASIK: So a weapon of mass destruction might cause the
military to assume greater power. What about a purely political crisis? Could
the military step in if, say, the Constitution were unclear on a course of
action? DUNLAP: One interesting scenario would
be a crisis between the branches of government that are expected to control the
military. I.E., if the armed forces were caught between the orders of the
president, the Congress, or even the courts, and there were no constitutional
path to resolve the disagreement.” (Ibid.; p. 46.)
12.
“KOHN: Wouldn’t the armed forces simply freeze? They’d be
paralyzed. LUTTWAK: It’s a very interesting line of inquiry. Let’s say a
president, exercising his proper and legitimate presidential authority,
initiates a military action. Then Congress wakes up and says, ‘Wait a minute,
this president is berserk; he’s starting a war, and we’re against it.’ But in
the meantime, the military force has already been put in a very compromised
situation. If things were moving very fast, the military might well take an
unconstitutional action. KOHN: Something similar actually happened
during Reconstruction: there were conflicting orders from the Congress and the
president. LUTTWAK: What were the details? KOHN: It was
1867, when Grant was the commanding general. BACEVICH: The
president, Andrew Johnson, was in favor of a rapid reconciliation and minimal
political change. The Congress, under the control of radical Republicans, wanted
to impose change on the South, and also thereby consolidate Republican control
of the region. This dispute came to a head when Congress passed laws that
essentially stripped Johnson of his control over the army: as far as
Reconstruction was concerned, Grant and Edwin Stanton, who was secretary of
war, were to take their marching orders from Congress. When Johnson fired
Stanton, Grant found himself both the commanding general of the army and the
acting secretary of war. But he struck an obedient, apolitical pose, and he
continued to do the bidding of Congress.” (Idem.)
13.
The panelists note that conflicting orders between branches of the
government, as well as a presidential mandate to undertake the impossible might
be required to bring about a military coup. “LUTTWAK:
What about a situation in which the military was ordered to start a war that it
did not believe could be won? Imagine that President Bush orders the American
armed forces to effect a landing in Fujian province and march up to Beijing.
The army would say, ‘Of course, Mr. President, we’re willing to obey orders.
But we have to have a universal military conscription, we have to bring our
forces up to four million and a half.’ And imagine that Bush refuses. BACEVICH: The military would leak it to the Washington
Post, and the war would never happen. It’s the Bosnia case: when President
Clinton wanted to intervene in Bosnia, General Barry McCaffrey testified to
Congress and gave a wildly inflated projection of the number of occupation
troops that would be required. By overstating the cost of the operation, the
generals changed the political dynamic and Clinton found his hands tied, at
least for a period of time.” (Idem.)
14.
The panelists also note that the military is seen by the general
population as a great “problem solver.” Will
the public “demand” that the military get involved in society in ways that are
unprecedented? “WASIK: Let’s get back, though, to
the subject of crises, whether real or contrived. It seems as though the
American public wants to see the military step in during these situations. A
poll taken just after Hurricane Katrina found that 69 percent of people wanted
to see the military serve as the primary responder to natural disasters. DUNLAP: People don’t fully appreciate what the military
is. By design it is authoritarian, socialistic, undemocratic. Those qualities
help the armed forces to serve their very unique purpose in our society:
namely, external defense against foreign enemies. In the military we look to
destroy threats, not apprehend them for processing through a system that
presumes them innocent until proven guilty. And I should add that if you do try
to imprint soldiers with the restraint that a police force needs, then you
disadvantage them against the ruthless adversaries that real war involves. WASIK: Then why do so many Americans say they want to see
the military get involved in law enforcement, ‘peacekeeping,’ etc.? DUNLAP: Americans today have an incredible trust in the
military. In poll after poll they have much more confidence in the armed forces
than they do in other institutions. The most recent poll, just this past
spring, had trust in the military at 74 percent, while Congress was at 22
percent and the presidency was at 44 percent. In other words, the armed forces
are much more trusted than the civilian institutions that are supposed to
control them.” (Ibid.; pp. 46-47.)
15.
One of the most important parts of the discussion concerns the belief
on the parts of the panelists that “militarized civilians” could create a
“creeping coup” by institutionalizing national security and a culture of
conflict. The panelists feel that events such as the cold war and 9/11 have
generated an impetus toward this situation. As will be seen below, the
panelists feel that the administration of George W. Bush has accelerated this
trend. “BACEVICH: The question that arises is
whether, in fact, we’re not already experiencing what is in essence a creeping
coup d’état. But it’s not people in uniform who are seizing power. It’s
militarized civilians, who conceive of the world as such a dangerous place that
military power has to predominate, that constitutional constraints on the
military need to be loosened. The ideology of national security has become ever
more woven into our politics. It has been especially apparent since 9/11, but
more broadly it’s been going on since the beginning of the Cold War. KOHN: The Constitution is being warped. BACEVICH: Here we don’t need to conjure up hypothetical
scenarios of the president deploying troops, etc. We have a president who
created a program that directs the National Security Agency, which is part of
the military, to engage in domestic eavesdropping. LUTTWAK: I don’t know if this would be called a coup. KOHN: Because it’s so incremental? LUTTWAK: It’s more like an erosion. The president is
usurping additional powers. Although what’s interesting is that the president’s
usurpation of this particular power was entirely unnecessary. The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act court, which approves terrorism-related requests
for wiretaps, can be summoned over the telephone in a matter of minutes. In its
entire history, it has said no to a request for surveillance only a handful of
times, and those were cases where there was a mistake in the request. Really,
even a small-town sheriff can get any interception he wants, so long as after
the fact he can show a judge that there was reasonable cause.” (Ibid.;
p. 47.)
16.
“BACEVICH: Bush’s move was unnecessary if the object of the
exercise was to engage in surveillance. It was very useful indeed if the object
is to expand executive power. KOHN: Which is exactly what has been the
agenda since the beginning of this administration. LUTTWAK: Now
you’re attributing motives. BACEVICH: Yes, I am! If you read John
Yoo, he suggests that one conscious aim of the project was to eliminate
constraints on the chief executive when it comes to matters of national
security. DUNLAP: I will say that even if it was a completely legal project,
there is a question of how appropriate it is for the armed forces to be
involved in that kind of activity. Since, as I noted before, the American
people have much less confidence in those institutions of civilian control than
they do in the armed forces, we need to be very careful about what we ask the
military to do, even assuming it’s legal.” (Idem.)
17.
The panelists continue to discuss a “creeping coup” underway, that
stems from actions that President Bush has initiated. “WASIK: If we are talking about a ‘creeping coup’ that is
already under way, in what direction is it creeping? BACEVICH: The creeping coup deflects attention away from
domestic priorities and toward national-security matters, so that is where all
our resources get deployed. ‘Leadership’ today is what is demonstrated in the
national-security realm. The current presidency is interesting in that regard.
What has Bush accomplished apart from posturing in the role of commander in
chief? He declares wars, he prosecutes wars, he insists we must continue to
prosecute wars. KOHN: By framing the
terrorist threat itself as a war, we tend to look upon our national security
from a much more military perspective. BACEVICH:
We don’t get Social Security reform, we don’t get immigration reform. The role
of the president increasingly comes to be defined by his military function. KOHN: And so our foreign policy becomes militarized. We
neglect our diplomacy, de-emphasize allies.” (Idem.)
18.
In addition, the panelists see the civilian sector’s high regard for
the military actually accentuating the military’s role in society. “DUNLAP: Well, without commenting on this particular
subject—KOHN: You shouldn’t. [Laughs] DUNLAP: —is this not something that is decided at the ballot
box? I mean, aren’t these the kinds of issues that the American people decide
when they elect a president? KOHN: But you
imply by that statement, Charlie, that the ballot box exists as a kind of
pristine, uncontextualized Athenian gathering at the square to vote. In fact,
the ballot box in this country is the product of how things are framed by the
political parties, by the political leaders. Also, very few of our
congressional districts now are really contested, after gerrymandering. Very
few of our Senate seats are real contests. LUTTWAK:
It becomes about personalities: you ask an American citizen to choose between
Laura Bush and Teresa Heinz Kerry, and they choose Laura Bush. But it doesn’t
mean that they favor the misuse of the American military to try and change the
political culture of Afghanistan. This is madness—and it is bipartisan madness.
BACEVICH: That’s a key point. LUTTWAK: Bipartisan madness. This is not even militarism.
Militarism had to do with eminent professors of Greek desperate to become
reserve officers so they could be invited to the military ball. That’s
militarism. This is an intoxication about what the actual capabilities of any
military force could be.” (Ibid.; pp. 47-48.)
19.
Again, the panelists feel that the military’s capability for using
political influence to realize its goals is significant. “DUNLAP: This intoxication with the military’s capabilities
certainly isn’t coming from the uniformed military officers. BACEVICH: Except insofar as they are involved in the
playing of politics, in constantly pressing for more resources. Meanwhile,
we’ve underfunded the State Department for twenty-five years. LUTTWAK: I once was privy to a peace negotiation conducted
in the corridors of the State Department. The State Department literally had no
funds to give lunch to the participants, a fact that both sides complained
bitterly about. DUNLAP: Well, I don’t think
it’s anything new that the State Department is underfunded. The State
Department has no bases in any state, so it does not have a constituency. But
in terms of the expenditure of resources in the Department of Defense, that is
very much controlled by civilians and not military commanders. LUTTWAK: But it is still the military that has the
resources. BACEVICH: And so over time—because
this has happened over time—you create a bias for military action. Which agency
of government has the capacity to act? Well, the Department of Defense does.
And that bias gets continually reinforced, and helps to create a circumstance
in which any president who wants to appear effective, and therefore to win
reelection, sees that the opportunity to do so is by acting in the military
sphere.” (Ibid.; p. 48.)
20.
An overlooked factor is the all-volunteer military’s demographic bias,
and how that affects the military’s influence in society. “WASIK: I want to address the question of partisanship in
the military. Insofar as there is a ‘culture war’ in America, everyone seems to
agree that the armed forces fight on the Republican side. And this is borne out
in polls: self-described Republicans outnumber Democrats in the military by
more than four to one, and only 7 percent of soldiers describe themselves as
‘liberal.’ KOHN: It has become part of the
informal culture of the military to be Republican. You see this at the military
academies. They pick it up in the culture, in the training establishments. DUNLAP: The military is an inherently conservative
organization, and this is true of all militaries around the world. Also the
demographics have changed: people in the South who were Democratic twenty years
ago have become Republican today. BACEVICH:
Yes, all militaries are conservative. But since 1980 our military has become
conservative in a more explicitly ideological sense. And that allegiance has
been returned in spades by the conservative side in the culture war, which sees
soldiers as virtuous representatives of how the country ought to be.” (Idem.)
21.
“KOHN: And meanwhile there is a streak of anti-militarism
on the left. BACEVICH: It’s not that people on the left disdain the
military but rather that they are just agnostic about it. They don’t identify
with soldiers or soldiering. LUTTWAK: And their children have less of
a propensity to serve in the military. Parents who describe themselves as
liberal are less likely to make positive noises to their children about the
armed forces. DUNLAP: Which brings up a crucial point. Let’s accept as a
fact that the U.S. military has become more overtly ideological since 1980.
What has happened since 1980? Roughly, that was the beginning of the
all-volunteer force. What we are seeing right now is the result of twenty-five
years of an all-volunteer force, in which people have self-selected into the
organization. BACEVICH: But the military is also recruited. And it
doesn’t seem to me that the military has much interest in whether or not the
force is representative of American society.” (Idem.)
22.
Because of the demographics of military recruitment, the military is
more conservative than society as a whole, something the panelists feel is
creating a growing disparity between the civilian and military segments of our
country. “KOHN: I don’t think that’s true. BACEVICH: Where do you think recruiting command is focused
right now? It’s focused on those evangelicals, it’s on the rural South. We are
reinforcing the lack of representativeness in the military because of the
concentrated recruiting efforts among groups predisposed to serve. DUNLAP: They are so focused on getting qualified people. The
military is going to the Supreme Court so that it can recruit on campuses where
currently we’re not able to. KOHN: That’s just
law schools. DUNLAP: But it has implications
across the armed forces. BACEVICH: The
recruiters go for the rich turf, which is where the evangelicals are. You have
to work a hell of a lot harder to recruit people from Newton and Wellesley,
Massachusetts. KOHN: Or anywhere in the
well-to-do or even middle-class suburbs. BACEVICH:
In an economic sense, the services are behaving quite rationally. But in doing
so they perpetuate the fact that we have a military that in no way ‘looks like’
American society.” (Ibid.; p. 49.)
23.
“DUNLAP: The other part of the problem is the behavior of
the politicians. They realize the affection that American people have for
people in uniform. BACEVICH: And so they land on aircraft carriers to prance
around in the flight suit of a fighter jock. Both parties now see the military
vote as being a part of politics, as a constituency. It’s a constituency that
the Republicans think they own and intend to continue to own. It’s a
constituency that the Democrats want to pry away. KOHN: And
partisanship in the military overall, i.e., the percentage of the military that
identifies with a party as opposed to being ‘independent’ or non-affiliated, is
much greater overall. Not only are military officers more partisan than the
general population; they’re more partisan than, say, business leaders and other
elite groups. I’ve tracked the numbers of retired four-star generals and
admirals endorsing a candidate in presidential campaigns, and it’s vastly up in
the last two elections. BACEVICH: Remember at the Democratic National Convention,
where General Claudia Kennedy introduced General John Shalikashvili to address
the delegates? Why were they up there? There was only one reason: to try to
match the parade of retired senior officers that the Republicans have long been
trotting out on political occasions. KOHN: But is that to get military
votes? Or just to connect with the American people on national security and
patriotism? BACEVICH: It’s both. In 2000, the Republican National
Committee put ads in the Army Times and other service magazines attacking
the Clinton/Gore record. To me that was, quite frankly, contemptible. WASIK: It seems
as if the two are related: if it’s reported that you have the support of the
military—as was the case before the 2004 election, when newspapers noted that
Kerry had less than 20 percent support within the military—then you get a halo
effect among the rest of the voters. Does the partisanship of our military
present a danger to the nation? KOHN: One of the great pillars in our
history that has prevented military intervention in politics has been the
military’s nonpartisan attitude. That’s why General George Marshall’s
generation of officers essentially declined to vote at all, as did generations
before them. In fact, for the first time in over a century we now have an
officer corps that does identify overwhelmingly with one political party. And
that is corrosive.” (Idem.)
24.
During the Clinton administration, the military/civilian rift produced
several instances of conflict between the two parts of society. “KOHN: Consider this glaring example of political
manipulation by the military: After every other American war before the Cold
War, the country demobilized its wartime military establishment. Even during
the Cold War, when we kept a large standing military, we expanded and
contracted it for shooting wars. But in 1990 and 1991, the military—through
General Colin Powell, who was head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the
time—intervened and effectively prevented a demobilization. BACEVICH: More accurately, I’d say that he prevented any
discussion of a demobilization. KOHN: That’s
right. DUNLAP: We did have a reduction in the
size of the military. There were cuts of around 9 percent, in both dollars and
manpower. KOHN: But it was nothing compared
to the end of great American wars prior to that. BACEVICH: Powell is explicit on this in his memoirs. ‘I was determined to
have the Joint Chiefs drive the military strategy train,’ he wrote. He was not
going to have ‘military reorganization schemes shoved down our throat.’ KOHN: This was not a coup, but it was very clearly a
circumvention of civilian political authority.
BACEVICH: Let us also consider the classic case of gays in the military. Bill
Clinton ran for the presidency saying he would issue an executive order that
did for gays what Harry Truman did for African Americans. He wins the election.
When he tries to do precisely what he said he would do, it triggers a firestorm
of opposition in the military. This was not the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff merely saying, in private, ‘Mr. President, I would like to give you my
professional opinion.’ KOHN: It was the most
open revolt the American military as a whole has ever engaged in. LUTTWAK: Ever? KOHN: Open
revolt, yes.” (Ibid.; pp. 49-50.)
25.
Falling well outside of the accepted guidelines of civilian-military
dialogue was the virulent criticism of the Clinton administration over its
decision to allow gays to serve openly in the military. “BACEVICH: Now, Clinton’s actions were ill-advised, to put
it mildly. But what we got was something like rebellion. Two Marines published
an op-ed in the Washington Post, warning the Joint Chiefs that if they
failed to stop this policy from being implemented, they were likely to lose the
loyalty of junior officers. I mean, holy smokes. DUNLAP: Which brings up the issue: How transparent should the uniformed
side of the armed forces be about their opinions? I will tell you, it is very
difficult for serving officers to figure out exactly where the line is. There
are points where they feel that their military values require them to speak
out. KOHN: I’m not sympathetic. As professional
military officers, they are called upon to make far more difficult decisions in
far more ambiguous and dangerous situations. The civil-military relationship is
one of the most important parts of their profession, and if they are not
educated and prepared enough to make the proper judgments, then they don’t
belong in high-ranking positions.” (Ibid.; p. 50.)
26.
The panelists further highlight the contentious debate between the Clinton
administration and the military over the issue of gays serving in the military.
“LUTTWAK: It seems as though we should take into
account the views of the armed forces in regard to military questions and
nothing more. The military is like a surgeon. If you go to a hospital—even if
you own the hospital—you will defer to the surgeon if he tells you that
you need your appendix out rather than your leg cut off. But if the surgeon
starts talking about religion or politics or homosexuality, you wouldn’t defer
to him at all. KOHN: But with gays in the
military, the officers framed it in military terms. They said that revoking the
ban would destroy the good order and discipline of the armed forces. LUTTWAK: In the showers. KOHN: Exactly. In retrospect, it was a foolish
argument—but that was how they framed it, in military terms. LUTTWAK: So how should it have been done differently?
President Clinton comes in and wants to allow homosexuals to serve in the
military. Do soldiers have the right to express themselves on this? KOHN: Not publicly. DUNLAP:
By law, you can contact your congressman. LUTTWAK:
Right. DUNLAP: That may be the answer. The
answer may be you can just do it on an individual basis. KOHN: On a private basis.” (Idem.)
27.
More about public disagreements between civilian and military
government officials: “LUTTWAK: But let’s consider
a more recent example. One day General Eric Shinseki, chief of staff of the
U.S. Army, happened to be testifying on Capitol Hill. Somebody asked him about
a possible invasion of Iraq, and General Shinseki—reflecting what, as I
understand it, was the view of anyone who had ever looked at that country and
counted its population—said that it would take several hundred thousand troops
to control Iraq. Whereupon Shinseki was publicly contradicted by his civilian
superiors, who ridiculed his professional opinion. DUNLAP: Right. Dick, do you consider that to have been
appropriate feedback for him? KOHN: No,
Shinseki behaved appropriately. In contradicting and disparaging him, the civilians
signaled to the military that they did not want candor even when it is
required, which is in front of Congress. DUNLAP:
There are two other interesting examples with General Pace, our current
chairman. One was when he differed with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld about what a
military person should do if he or she is present when there’s an abuse during
an interrogation process. Pace insisted that the military had the obligation to
intervene—which I think is the right answer. KOHN: But afterward he fudged it and claimed that there was
no disagreement with the secretary. DUNLAP: Be
that as it may, I think it was the right answer. The second and, I think, more
difficult scenario was when Representative Jack Murtha said that he wouldn’t
join the armed forces today, nor would he expect others to do so. General Pace
publicly criticized Murtha’s remarks. Here was another instance in which the
senior representative of the uniformed military spoke out in what was arguably
a political context against civilian leadership. But in this case again, I
thought it was appropriate.” (Idem.)
28.
The panelists conclude by noting that the political influence of the
military gives it considerable control over the course of civic events in this
country. “WASIK: So it seems clear that whether
we like it or not, the military has learned how to use the political system to
protect its interests and also to uphold what it sees as its values. Thinking
over the long term, are there any dangers inherent in this? KOHN: Well, at this point the military has a long tradition
of getting what it wants. If we ever attempted to truly demobilize—i.e., if the
military were suddenly, radically cut back—it could lead if not to a coup then
to very severe civil-military tension. BACEVICH:
Because the political game would no longer be prejudiced in the military’s
favor. KOHN: That’s right. BACEVICH: But there is a more subtle danger too. The
civilian leadership knows that in dealing with the military, they are dealing
with an institution whose behavior is not purely defined by adherence to the
military professional ethic, disinterested service, civilian subordination.
Instead, the politicians know that they’re dealing with an institution that to
some degree has its own agenda. And if you’re dealing with somebody who has his
own agenda, well, you can bargain, you can trade. That creates a small
opening—again, not to a coup but to the military making deals with politicians
whose purposes may not be consistent with the Constitution.” (Idem.)
29.
An indication of the economic distress afflicting this country is the
fact that a number of states are leasing roadways to foreign companies in an
attempt to generate revenue. One possibility for a declaration of martial law
might be the social chaos that would follow an economic collapse in the United
States. “Its official state motto is ‘the
crossroads of America.’ Yet Indiana is about to turn over its entire toll road
for the next 75 years to two foreign companies, making it more expensive to
drive. The decision to hand the Indiana Toll Road to an Australian and Spanish
team for $3.8 billion at the end of this month has blown up into one of the
biggest brawls here in a generation. It has unsettled the state's politics in
the months before the November elections, pitting a governor who was President
Bush's first budget director against the people of northern Indiana, which the
highway passes through. The decision also places Indiana at the leading edge of
a nascent trend in which states and local governments are exploring the idea of
privatizing parts of the United States' prized interstate highway system. The
idea goes beyond projects, such as Northern Virginia's Dulles Greenway, in
which states have turned to private companies to build or widen toll roads.
Now, they are considering selling or leasing some of the best-known and
most-traveled routes across America. . . .” (“Strapped States Try
New Route, Lease Toll Roads to Foreign Firms” by Amy Goldstein; Washington
Post; 6/14, 2006; P. A01.)
30.
The broadcast concludes with a book review of a volume about an attempt
by Puerto Rican nationalists on the life of President Harry Truman. Although
the incident has been bleached of its political overtones over the years, it is
significant that doctrinaire fascists performed the attempted assassination—which
might well have succeeded. One should note that in this time period, the GOP
and elements of the intelligence community were actively importing fascist
veterans of World War II in order to incorporate them into the Republican
Party. This was specifically in an attempt to neutralize the political
influence of President Truman. (For more about this operation, which resulted
in the formation of a permanent Nazi/fascist branch of the GOP, see—among other
programs—FTR#465.) “Forty-two years later, Americans remain transfixed by the
assassination of John F. Kennedy, an event that has spawned a cottage industry
of articles, books, movies and film documentaries. Killers who rob a nation of
a popular president leave names remembered in infamy. Their success generates a
thousand explanations. Failure, on the other hand, is an orphan. In American
Gunfight, Stephen Hunter, a novelist and film critic, and John Bainbridge,
Jr., an attorney and legal journalist, examine the nearly forgotten attempt of
two Puerto Rican National Party adherents, Griselio Torresola and Oscar
Collazo, to kill President Harry Truman in November 1950. Truman was
temporarily living in Blair House at the time. Torresola and Collazo, guns
blazing, attempted to storm the residence but never made it inside. The episode
occurred two days after the National Party had attempted to assassinate Puerto
Rican Gov. Luis Munoz Marin and seize control of Puerto Rico. In some way,
Torresola and Collazo imagined, Truman’s death would further the cause of
Puerto Rican independence. . . .” (‘Terrorists
in Washington’ by Stephen Hunter and John Bainbridge Jr.; Wall Street
Journal; 11/8/2005; p. D8.)
31.
The would-be assassins were members of a Puerto Rican fascist party. It
is worth noting that Puerto Rico was among those areas in the Spanish-speaking
world that were focal points of fascist activism of the Falange, based in Spain
and backed by the Nazis. Is it possible that the assassins were acting as part
of a wider fascist milieu, perhaps directed by the Underground Reich? (Read
about the Falange at two URL’s: http://www.spitfirelist.com/Books/chase1a.pdf
and http://www.spitfirelist.com/Books/chase2a.pdf.
An introduction to the book Falange by Alan Chase can be found at: http://www.spitfirelist.com/Books/Falange.html.)
“. . . The National Party was a fascist
organization with little popular support, led by a would-be Mussolini,
supported by a black-shirted militia. In American Gunfight, its
operatives are given human identities; by contrast, Gov. Munoz Marin, a widely
esteemed liberal whose programs improved the lives of Puerto Ricans, is given
little substance. . . .” (Idem.)