FTR#411—The Bayer Facts—I.G. Farben and the Politics of Murder—(Two
30-minute segments) (Sources are noted in parentheses.) (Recorded on
5/25/2003.)
Note: FTR#’s 260-316, 317, 324,
FTR#325 and succeeding programs are streaming
on Real Audio at www.wfmu.org/daveemory.
FTR#’s 01-270, 316-324 are available
for download only, also on Real
Audio, on their Archive Page.)
Note: Users of this website are emphatically
encouraged to create a word document out of the program descriptions and do a
“search” on individual subjects in order to more completely reference those items.
Note: Users of
this website (as well as the two WFMU web addresses noted above) are emphatically encouraged to use the
internet to disseminate as much of the audio and printed material as possible. It is all FREE!
Note: It is
recommended that listeners print the program descriptions for optimum
readability. It is emphatically
encouraged that listeners use the printed files on the Spitfire website and the
audio files on the WFMU websites to create their own research/teaching
databases.
Summary of FTR#411—(Note: The massive volume of “For The Record”
programs about 9/11 and related topics is summarized and analyzed in the
periodically-updated description for FTR#391. It
is recommended that listeners use this description and e-mail it to others.
Also: The “meat” of the book “Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile” has been digested
into an extended description for FTR#305.
Listeners can now e-mail this quintessentially important book to people around
the world. In addition, the professional history of the late Paul Manning, the
book’s author, is presented in the description “About
Paul Manning.” This enables listeners to acquaint others with Mr.
Manning’s journalistic credentials. Understanding the Bormann organization is
essential to comprehending the concept of “the Underground Reich.”) FTR#411 presents some of
the history and functional aspects of the I.G. Farben chemical cartel, the
Bayer pharmaceutical firm, in particular. Growing out of the merger of
Germany’s top chemical and pharmaceutical firms at the end of World War I, the
I.G. Farben company and its post World War II successor companies are at the
very epicenter of the history of twentieth century industry. Unfortunately,
they have been responsible for a great deal of destruction, both as the
backbone of Hitler’s war production and as the marketers of drugs that have
done great damage to humanity. Much of the first side of the program highlights
Bayer’s frankly suspicious decision to retain control of its pharmaceutical
division five days before the first anthrax attacks. After dropping 30% in
value, the firm’s stock increased 33% after the anthrax attacks—Bayer is the
manufacturer of Cipro, the treatment of choice for anthrax infection. An
equally suspicious gambit was Bayer’s decision to continue to sell a drug used
to treat hemophilia, even after it was evident that the drug (derived from
blood plasma) was infected with HIV. A major portion of the broadcast is
devoted to analysis of the I.G.’s role in the postwar Bormann organization. Inextricably
linked with both the Bormann flight capital program and the postwar operations
of the Underground Reich, I.G. Farben and its Big Three successor companies
(Hoechst, BASF and Bayer) wield pivotal influence in the contemporary
commercial landscape.
Program Highlights Include: The decision
by Bayer to retain a company insider as head of the firm shortly before the
anthrax attacks in the US; the selection of two “I.G. insiders” as heads of the
Vivendi and Berthelsmann media firms (principal focal points of the series on
German corporate control of the American media); the continued dominance of
I.G. Farben in the post World War II French industrial economy; the Leuna
refinery in the former East Germany and its central role in the CDU funding
scandal (see FTR#’s 194, 276, 278);
a review of the “Battle of Leuna” (one of the decisive aerial engagements of
World War II).
1.
Beginning discussion of the I.G. Farben firm, the broadcast sets forth an
interesting piece of the history of the Bayer company—one of the most important
elements of the I.G. Farben combine. (For more about I.G. Farben, see—among
other programs—RFA#’s 1, 2 as well
as Miscellaneous Archive Shows M8, M11
(available from Spitfire), as well
as FTR#’s 194, 216, 276, 278, 294, 305,
341, 395, 408.) “Bayer’s pharmaceutical venture was even larger [than that
of Hoechst]. Out of its laboratories emerged aspirin, the world’s most famous
home remedy for pain and fever. Bayer was also responsible for the introduction
of heroin, which it sold as a cure for morphine addiction and as a cough
suppressant, especially effective in children. Later the Bayer laboratories
developed methadone, in preparation for World War II, as a synthetic substitute
for morphine. It was originally named Dolophine, in honor of Adolf Hitler.
Today, methadone is used principally in the treatment of heroin addiction.” (The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben;
Joseph Borkin; Copyright 1978 [HC] by The Free Press [a division of MacMillan];
ISBN 0-02-904630-0; pp. 6-7.)
2.
An important (and largely overlooked) aspect of the 9/11 attacks
concerns the curious maneuvering of the Bayer company. Five days before the
anthrax letters were mailed (on September 18, 2001), Bayer made an interesting
decision not to sell its embattled pharmaceuticals division. Of great
significance in that context was its equally surprising decision to appoint a
long-time company insider as the head of the division, in defiance of what had
been forecast by investment analysts. As will be seen later, the decision to
retain a longtime Bayer operative as head of the pharmaceuticals branch is
consistent with Bayer’s status as one of the core companies of the Bormann
organization. “Defying
expectations, Bayer A.G. said today that it would not sell its embattled
pharmaceuticals unit after all, and it named a longtime executive, not a fresh
face from outside the company, to succeed its chief executive, Manfred
Schneider. Though it made clear that it was not happy about the idea, Bayer
seemed to be heeding increased pressure to get out of the drug business. Last
month, it was forced to withdraw a cholesterol-lowering drug, Baycol, which had
been linked to 52 deaths and is the subject of a class-action lawsuit in the United
States. Baycol was crucial to the drug unit’s revenue and profit growth,
analysts said, and its withdrawal made plain that Bayer was no longer big
enough in the drug business to thrive independently.” (“Bayer Won’t
Sell Drug Unit and Picks Insider as Chief” by Suzanne Kapner; The New York Times; 9/14/2001; p. C10.)
3.
Bayer’s stock had dropped almost 30 percent as a result of the Baycol
scandal. “Analysts
and investors had also hoped that a fresh face in the chief executive’s office
after Mr. Schneider retires in April might make a break with corporate
strategy. But Bayer chose Werner Wenning, 54, a 30-year veteran of the company
who is now its chief financial officer. Mr. Schneider said today that an
outright sale of the drug unit had been ruled out. ‘Despite the major setback,’
he said, ‘these activities remain a core business of the Bayer Group that can
contribute substantially to enhancing the company’s value.’ Investors showed
their displeasure at the decision, made at a board meeting at company headquarters
in Leverkusen, Germany, by bidding Bayer’s stock down about 3 percent in
Frankfurt today. The stock has fallen
almost 30 percent since Baycol was recalled on Aug. 8. [Italics are Mr.
Emory’s]” (Idem.)
4.
One should not fail to note that Bayer’s stock appreciated
significantly as a result of the [as yet unsolved] anthrax attacks. It regained
all of the ground lost as a result of the Baycol fiasco. Bayer was the maker of
Cipro—the preferred treatment for anthrax. The possibility that the anthrax
attacks were perpetrated by the Underground Reich is not one to be too readily
dismissed. (It is interesting—and possibly significant—that the manipulation of
equities markets took place with regard to both the 9/11 attacks and the
assassination of President Kennedy. For more about the manipulation of the
commodity futures market in connection with the assassination of JFK, see FTR#327. For more about the short
selling of airline stocks, insurance stocks and manipulation of the Standard
& Poor’s 500 “put” options, see FTR#’s
327, 331, 357. For more about the possible connections of a South African
component of the Underground Reich to the anthrax attacks, see FTR#’s 317, 324, 386.) “ . . . Bayer, the
German maker of Cipro—the antibiotic of choice for anthrax infections—is
tripling its output of the drug. And
Bayer’s stock price has risen by more than 33% since the anthrax outbreaks
began. [Italics are Mr. Emory’s]” (“Biotechnology Stocks Are
Gaining on Anthrax Scare” by Charles Piller; Los Angeles Times; 10/18/2001; p. C1.)
5.
Supplementing information presented in previous broadcasts about AIDS
as a biological warfare weapon, this program highlights the disturbing fact
that Bayer continued to market a therapeutic drug for hemophiliacs to customers
in Third World countries even after it was apparent that the product was
contaminated with HIV. (For more about AIDS as a possible biological warfare
agent, see—among other programs—RFA#16 [available
from Spitfire], as well as FTR#’s 16, 19, 225, 269, 324.) “A division of
the pharmaceutical company Bayer sold millions of dollars of blood-clotting
medicine for hemophiliacs—medicine that carried a high risk of transmitting
AIDS—to Asia and Latin America in the mid-1980’s while selling a new, safer
product in the West, according to documents obtained by The New York Times. The Bayer unit, Cutter Biological, introduced
its safer medicine in late February as evidence mounted that the earlier
version was infecting hemophiliacs with H.I.V. Yet for over a year, the company
continued to sell the old medicine overseas, prompting a United States
regulator to accuse Cutter of breaking its promise to stop selling the
product.” (“2 Paths of Bayer Drug in 80’s: Riskier Type Went
Overseas” by Walt Bogdanich and Eric Koli; The
New York Times; 5/22/2003; p. 1; accessed at www.nytimes.com
.)
6.
“By continuing
to sell the old version of the life-saving medicine, the records show, Cutter
officials were trying to avoid being stuck with large stores of a product that
was proving increasingly unmarketable in the United States and Europe. Yet even
after it began selling the new product, the company kept making the old
medicine for several months more. A telex from Cutter to a distributor suggests
one reason behind that decision, too: the company had several fixed-price
contracts and believed that the old product would be cheaper to produce . . .” (Idem.)
7.
“ . . . ‘These
are the most incriminating internal pharmaceutical industry documents I have
ever seen,’ said Dr. Sidney M. Wolfe, who as director of the Public Citizen
Health Research Group has been investigating the industry’s practices for three
decades . . .” (Idem.)
8.
“ . . . The
medicine, called Factor VIII Concentrate, essentially provides the missing
ingredient without which hemophiliacs’ blood cannot clot. By injecting
themselves with it, hemophiliacs can stop bleeding or prevent bleeds from
starting; some use it as many as three times a week. It has helped hemophiliacs
lead normal lives. But in the early years of the AIDS epidemic, it became a
killer. The medicine was made using pools of plasma from 10,000 or more donors,
and since there was still no screening test for the AIDS virus, it carried a
high risk of passing along the disease; even a tiny number of H.I.V.—positive
donors could contaminate an entire pool.” (Idem.)
9.
“In the United
States, AIDS was passed on to thousands of hemophiliacs, many of whom died, in
one of the worst drug-related medical disasters in history.” (Idem.)
10.
The vast international infrastructure of the I.G. Farben firm and its
various subsidiary operations was a principal element of the Bormann
organization. I.G. Farben chief Hermann Schmitz discussed I.G.’s involvement
with the Bormann program. “In testimony
later given to Nuremberg investigators, Schmitz praised Bormann for the way he
had directed the distribution of German assets around the world. His own Farben
organization had, of course, contributed to the success of the operation. Every
regional representative working for Hermann Schmitz was an exceptional
businessman, or he would not have been with I.G. All had contributed sound
advice in their areas of competence, the regions of the world where they
represented Farben while keeping an eye on the subsidiaries of the parent
concern and the 700 hidden corporations they controlled. They had provided
assistance and continuing guidance in establishing the 750 new companies
created on order of Bormann, who wanted more than hidden assets; Bormann wanted
the money and patents and technicians put to work to create even greater assets
that would bolster Germany in the postwar years. In their meeting in the
chancellery, both men checked over the figures of sums disbursed, and they were
accurate to the pfennig.” (Martin Bormann: Nazi in Exile;
Paul Manning; Lyle Stuart 1981[HC]; Copyright 1981 by Paul Manning; ISBN
0-8184-0309-8; pp. 157-158.)
11.
Bormann and Schmitz then discussed I.G.’s prospects for the postwar
period. The firm’s cozy relationship with powerful elements within the power
elites of the Western allies was foreseen by Schmitz as boding well for the
company’s future. “The Reichsleiter asked Schmitz his views of the future.
Schmitz replied, ‘The occupation armies will be understanding in the West, but
certainly not in the East. I have instructed all Farben administrators and
technicians to come to the West, where they can be of use in resuming our
operations once the disturbances of 1945 come to a halt.’ Schmitz added that,
while general bomb damage to the I.G. plants was about 25 percent of capacity,
some were untouched. He mentioned speaking with Field Marshal Model, who was
commanding the defenses of the Ruhr. ‘Model had planned to turn our
Bayer-Leberkusen pharmaceutical factory into an artillery base, but he agreed
to make it an open, undefended factory. Hopefully, we will get it back
untouched.’ ‘What about your board of directors and the essential executives?
If they are held by the occupation authorities, can I.G. continue?’ Bormann
asked. ‘We can
continue. We have an operational plan for such a contingency, which everyone
understands. However, I don’t believe our board members will be detained too
long. Nor will I. But we must go through a procedure of investigation before
release, so I have been told by our N.W. 7 people who have excellent contacts
in Washington.’” (Ibid.; p. 158.) Schmitz’s predictions were
relatively accurate. Neither Schmitz nor any of the I.G. Farben executives were
severely punished and the firm’s three successor firms carried on effectively
in the postwar period. (See FTR-179.)
12.
Among the principal capital elements of the Bormann organization was
the enormous economic power of the Hermann Schmmitz Trust. “[Hermann] Schmitz’s wealth—largely I.G.
Farben bearer bonds converted to the Big Three successor firms, shares in Standard
Oil of New Jersey (equal to those held by the Rockefellers), as well as shares
in the 750 corporations he helped Bormann establish during the last year of
World War II—has increased in all segments of the modern industrial world. The
Bormann organization in South America utilizes the voting power of the Schmitz
trust along with their own assets to guide the multinationals they control, as
they keep steady the economic course of the Fatherland.” (Ibid.; p.
280.)
13.
Next, the broadcast sets forth the operations of the “Big Three”
successor firms to the I.G.—Bayer, Hoechst and BASF. It is important to note
that the Bormann organization retained the decisive reins of power in these
consummately important companies. “By 1956, the three major multinationals (Hoechst, BASF,
and Bayer) reshaped from the 159 companies within Germany that had comprised
I.G. Farben were generating record profits for the original 450 major Farben
stockholders, who had organized themselves into the I.G. Farben Stockholders
Protective committee in Bonn. The Big Three went on expanding, tripling
capitalization in 1956 from investment funds that poured in from the
interlocking companies established in safe haven countries by Martin Bormann
and Hermann Schmitz. There was a return, more vigorous than ever, of the huge,
monolithic industrial multinationals that dominated the German economy before
and during World War II.” (Ibid.; p. 282.)
14.
“Each of these
three spinoffs from I.G. Farben today does more business individually than did
Farben at its zenith, when its corporate structure covered 93 countries. BASF
and Bayer individually boast worldwide sales of nearly $10 billion annually,
while Hoechst, now the world’s largest chemical company, generated $16.01
billion in worldwide sales in 1980. Each does more business than E.I. du Pont
de Nemours, with sales of $9.4 billion. The United States is, of course, the
major market, one into which these German corporations continue to pour
investment money for both new capital construction and corporate takeovers.
BASF and Hoechst have each invested in excess of $1 billion in such expansions,
and chief Herbert Grunewald of Bayer A.G. has said that they plan a $1 billion
expansion in the United States within five to ten years. In Europe, Bayer A.G.
is parent of some 380 subsidiary operations. In the United States, it controls
Mobay Chemical whose annual sales in 1978 of $779.5 million make it the Bayer
group’s most formidable foreign subsidiary. Miles laboratories (maker of
Alka-Seltzer), Chemagro, Rhinechem, Cutter Laboratories, and Harmon Colors are
additional Bayer A.G. interests in this country that Grunewald says he plans to
double as part of his American expansion program.” (Ibid.; pp. 282-283.)
15.
“Together, these
three multinationals assure permanent prosperity for the original 450 Farben
stockholders, their banks, and the shadowy shareholders of the Bormann
organization in south America who guard and vote the Hermann Schmitz trust fund
through intermediaries at the annual meetings of BASF, Bayer and Hoechst.” (Ibid.; p. 283.)
16.
Reviewing the functioning of the successor firms to I.G. Farben in the
overall scheme of the Bormann outfit, the broadcast encapsulates that
organization’s power. “The Bormann organization continues to wield enormous
economic influence. Wealth continues to flow into the treasuries of its
corporate entities in South America, the United States, and Europe. Vastly
diversified, it is said to be the largest land-owner in South America and
through stockholdings controls German heavy industry and the trust established
by the late Hermann Schmitz, former president of I.G. Farben, who held as much
stock in Standard Oil of New Jersey as did the Rockefellers.” (Ibid.;
p. 292.)
17.
In the context of the article that follows, the program presents the decisive
influence of I.G. Farben’s control of patents and engineering skill in the
industry to perpetuate its control of the French chemical industry in the
postwar period. As discussed in (among other programs) Miscellaneous Archive Show M61—available from Spitfire—as well as FTR#’s
194, 276, 278, 305, 385, the effective economic occupation of France did
not end in 1945. The postwar structure of corporate Europe remained in the
effective control of corporate Germany which, in turn, is in the effective control
of the Bormann group. “I.G. Farben was a formidable ally for Reichsleiter Bormann
in his plans for the postwar economic rebirth of Germany. In a telephone
conversation with Dr. [Georg] von Schnitzler, Bormann asked what would the loss
of factories in France and the other occupied countries mean to German industry
in general and to I.G. in particular. Dr. von Schnitzler said he believed the
technical dependence of these countries on I.G. would be so great that despite
German defeat I.G., in one way or another, could regain its position of control
of the European chemical business. ‘They will need the constant technical help
of I.G.’s scientific laboratories as they do not own appropriate installations
within themselves.’” (Ibid.; p. 28.)
18.
Mr. Emory’s FTR series about
German corporate control of the American media dealt extensively with the
Vivendi firm of France and Berthelsmann A.G. of Germany. In mid-2002, both
Vivendi and Berthelsmann effected significant management changes. It is altogether revealing and highly
significant that Jean-Rene Fourtou had been the head of Rhone-Poulenc, a French
pharmaceuticals manufacturer which then merged (under the direction of Fourtou)
with Hoechst—one of the “Big Three” successor firms of the I.G. “Jean-Rene Fourtou
is the man with the unenviable task of rescuing the world’s second largest
media group from a group of angry bankers and shareholders . . . Mr. Fourtou
graduated in 1960 from the Ecole Polytechnique, France’s top business school
and the training ground for Mr. Messier, and joined management consultancy
Bossard, where he was chief executive and chairman between 1972 and 1986. Rhone-Poulenc the [formerly state-owned]
drugs manufacturer, recruited Mr. Fourtou as chairman and chief executive in
1986. In 2000, the company merged with Hoechst of Germany to form Aventis,
where he was vice-chairman. [Italics are Mr. Emory’s.] He is firmly
entrenched as a member of the old guard of the French business community.” (“Jean-Rene
Fourtou”; The Guardian; 7/8/2002;
accessed at MediaGuardian.co.uk; Copyright Guardian Newspapers Limited 2002.)
19.
Also indicative of the central position of the old I.G. complex and the
Bormann group in corporate Germany was the succession of Gunther Thielen to the
head of Berthelsmann. Thielen had a management
background with BASF, another of the successor firms to I.G. Farben. “1970 different
leading positions, group of BASF, Ludwigshafen. 1976 Technical manager, winter
resounding refinery, Kassel.” (“Dr. Gunther Thielen”; professional
biography accessed at www.step21.de/home2002/ .)
20.
The program concludes with review of “the Battle of Leuna”, one of the
key aerial engagements of World War II. In this battle, the U.S. Eighth Air
Force bombed the German synthetic fuel production out of effective operation,
thus starving the German war machine of petroleum. (As discussed in Miscellaneous Archive Show M11, as well
as FTR#’s 194, 276, 278, 341, 385,
I.G.’s synthetic fuel operation was inextricably linked with the Standard/I.G.
Agreement of 1929—one of the most important cartel agreements of the 20th
century. “May
12, 1944, was a fateful day for Germany and for I.G. On that day, the United
States Eighth Air Force sent 935 bombers over Germany to attack its synthetic
oil industry: 200 bombers concentrated on I.G.’s plant alone. This attack
marked the beginning of what the U.S. strategic bombing survey called ‘the
Battle of Leuna,’ classifying it as ‘one of the major battles of the war.’” (The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben;
p. 128.)
21.
“The next day,
Albert Speer, Reich minister for armaments and war production, toured the
wreckage of Leuna with Buetefisch. What he saw convinced him that ‘the
technological war was decided. . . . It meant the end of German armament
production.’ For Speer it was the turning point in the war. He immediately flew
to Hitler’s headquarters at Obersalzburg to report on the extent and meaning of
the disaster: ‘The enemy has struck us at one of our weakest points,’ he told
the Fuehrer. ‘If they persist at this time, we will soon have no fuel
production worth mentioning. Our one hope is that the other side has an air
force general staff as scatterbrained as ours!’” (Idem.)
22.
“Hitler then summoned
four of the top fuel experts from I.G., including Krauch and Buetefisch, for a
discussion about the consequences of the May 12 air raid. Goering and Speer
accompanied them to the meeting. Before the group went in to see Hitler, Speer
advised the four fuel experts to tell ‘the unvarnished truth.’ However, Goering
insisted that they not be too pessimistic. ‘He was probably afraid that Hitler
would place the blame for the debacle chiefly on him,’ Speer wrote later.
Krauch was determined to follow Speer’s advice. He told Hitler that Germany’s
position was hopeless if the enemy air raids on the synthetic oil plants
continued. To support his grim forecast, he presented Hitler with an impressive
array of facts and figures. . .” (Ibid.; pp. 128-129.)
23.
“The course of
the Battle of Leuna became the gauge for the state of German oil production. By
early July the resourceful I.G. technicians were able to restore Leuna to
seventy-five percent operating capacity. However, the Eighth Air Force returned
on July7, again bombing the plant to a halt. Two days later the plant started
operating again and by July 19 had reached fifty-three percent of capacity. And
so the cycle of bombings and reconstruction continued. But the total effect on
German fuel production was nothing less than catastrophic. Krauch concluded
that the only way fuel installations could be rebuilt after each raid was to
cannibalize other installations. Under this plan to prevent the total cessation
of oil production, Germany’s productive capacity diminished with each
recuperation. By September, oil production had dropped to fifteen percent, a
condition from which Germany was never to recover.” (Ibid.; p. 130.)
24.
In the context of both the Standard/I.G. Agreement of 1929 and the other
business arrangements that I.G. had with major western corporations, a
discussion of a “gentleman’s agreement” with key businessmen on the “other
side” not to bomb I.G’s synthetic fuel plants is more than a little
interesting. It is also significant to note that it is the old I.G. firm
Degussa that was at the core of Hitler’s program to develop an atomic bomb.
Degussa was instrumental in equipping Saddam Hussein with his nuclear
capability in the 1980’s and 1990’s. “The intensive bombing of Leuna led to a curious
confrontation between Buetefisch, who was in charge of Leuna, and Paul
Harteck, leading nuclear scientist
working on Germany’s atomic bomb project. Part of Leuna was devoted to the
manufacture of heavy water, a necessary component of atomic energy. After the
first bombs fell on Leuna, Buetefisch informed Harteck that the heavy water
installation must be abandoned. He claimed that the massive bombing could not
have been aimed at fuel production since there was a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’
between heavy industry in Germany and abroad that I.G.’s synthetic gasoline
plants would not be bombed. The only explanation for the raids against Leuna,
therefore, was the heavy water facility.” (Idem.)
25.
As one observes the maneuvering on the international and economic
stages, bear in mind the complex CDU funding scandal that linked the French Elf
oil company with a complex series of transactions involving the Thyssen firm,
Saudi Arabia, the Leuna refinery in East Germany (see FTR#’s 194, 276, 278, 385.) Airbus and the mysterious Karl-Heinz
Schreiber are at the core of this scandal. The German domination of corporate
France is another factor to consider in the context of the maneuvering around
the Iraq war. Although it may appear to some that events discussed above are
ancient history, they are actually at the foundation of the understanding of
the modern world. Speaking of the CDU funding scandal, The Financial Times wrote: “This could yet throw light on kickbacks paid by Elf over a
deal between Mr. Mitterand and German ex-chancellor Helmut Kohl to invest in
the Leuna refinery in East Germany—an affair which helped bring Mr. Kohl down.” (“French Trial Paints a Picture of Graft on a
Grandiose Scale” by Robert Graham; Financial
Times; 4/22/2003; p. 14.)