FTR#363—Operation Northwoods--(One 30-minute segment) (Sources are noted in parentheses.) (Recorded on 6/16/2002.)
This
program focuses on a chilling set of provocations that were tentatively planned
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the early 1960’s. Although they were not formally instituted (as far as anyone can
tell), the scenarios discussed below may
have been employed later on during the Cold War. Mr. Emory believes that the thinking that characterized elements
of the national security establishment at this time is very important to
understand in the light of 9/11 attacks.
It should be noted that Mr. Emory
does not believe that 9/11 was a
provocation, in and of, itself. Rather,
there are extremists in control of the Bush administration who appear to be
utilizing the attacks in an altogether opportunistic, cynical and fascistic
fashion. The
milieu involved in Northwoods is the milieu that spawned the Bush
administration. What they will continue
to do, if not turned out of power, is not pleasant to contemplate. (For more about 9/11 see FTR#’s 325-362.) Note: FTR#’s
260-315, FTR#325 and succeeding programs are streaming on Real Audio at www.wfmu.org/daveemory. FTR#’s
01-270 are available for download
only, also on Real Audio, at http://archive.wfmu.org:5555/archive/DX/.)
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1.
The discussion begins with Operation Northwoods’ genesis. The plan grew out of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s
dissatisfaction with President Kennedy’s reticence to invade Cuba. (The chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the
time was General Lyman Lemnitzer, who was involved in the Operation Sunrise
negotiations for the surrender of the SS forces in Italy. The “Sunrise” milieu involved Bush family
investment adviser Allen Dulles, SS General Karl Wolff (Himmler’s personal
adjutant), and Nazi operative Francois Genoud (whose name has cropped up in
connection with 9/11 in several contexts.
(For more about Genoud, Dulles, Wolff etc., see FTR#333, among other programs.)
2.
“Although no
one in Congress could have known it at the time, Lemnitzer and the Joint Chiefs had quietly slipped over the edge.
According to secret and long-hidden documents obtained for Body of Secrets, the Joint Chiefs of Staff drew up and approved
plans for what may be the most corrupt plan ever created by the U.s.
government. In the name of
anticommunism, they proposed launching a secret and bloody war of terrorism
against their own country in order to trick the American public into supporting
an ill-conceived war they intended to launch against Cuba.” (Body of
Secrets; by James Bamford; Copyright 2002 [SC]; Anchor Books [Random
House]; ISBN 0-385-49907-8; p. 82.)
3.
“Codenamed
Operation Northwoods, the plan, which had the written approval of the Chairman
and every member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for innocent people to be
shot on American streets; for boats carrying refugees fleeing Cuba to be sunk
on the high seas; for a wave of violent terrorism to be launched in Washington,
D.C., Miami, and elsewhere. People
would be framed for bombings they did not commit; planes would be
hijacked. Using phony evidence, all of
it would be blamed on Castro, thus giving Lemnitzer and his cabal the excuse,
as well as the public and international backing, they needed to launch their
war.” (Idem.)
4.
“The idea may
have actually originated with President Eisenhower in the last days of his
administration. With the Cold War
hotter than ever and the recent U-2 scandal fresh in the public’s memory, the
old general wanted to go out with a win.
He wanted desperately to invade Cuba in the weeks leading up to
Kennedy’s inauguration; indeed, on January 3 he told Lemnitzer and other aides
in his Cabinet Room that he would move against Castro before the inauguration
if only the Cubans gave him a really good excuse. Then, with time growing short, Eisenhower floated an idea. If Castro failed to provide that excuse,
perhaps, he said, the United States ‘could think of manufacturing something
that would be generally acceptable.’
What he was suggesting was a pretext—a bombing, an attack, an act of
sabotage—carried out secretly against the United States by the United States. Its purpose
would be to justify the launching of a war.
It was a dangerous suggestion by a desperate president. Although no such war took place, the idea
was not lost on General Lemnitzer. But
he and his colleagues were frustrated by Kennedy’s failure to authorize their
plan, and angry that Castro had not provided an excuse to invade.” (Ibid.; pp. 82-83.)
5.
“Operation
Northwoods called for a war in which many patriotic Americans and innocent
Cubans would die senseless deaths—all to satisfy the egos of twisted generals
back in Washington, safe in their tax-payer-financed homes and limousines. One idea seriously considered involved the
launch of John Glenn, the first American to orbit the earth. On February 20, 1962, Glenn was to lift off
from Cape Canaveral, Florida, on his historic journey. The flight was to carry the banner of
America’s virtues of truth, freedom, and democracy into orbit high over the
planet. But Lemnitzer and his Chiefs
had a different idea. They proposed to
[General Edward] Lansdale that, should the rocket explode and kill Glenn, ‘the
objective is to provide irrevocable proof that . . . the fault lies with the
Communists et al Cuba. [sic]’ This would be accomplished, Lemnitzer
continued, ‘by manufacturing various pieces of evidence which would prove
electronic interference on the part of the Cubans.’ Thus, as NASA prepared to send the first American into space, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff were preparing to use John Glenn’s possible death as a
pretext to launch a war.” (Ibid.; pp. 83-84.)
6.
“Glenn lifted
into history without mishap, leaving Lemnitzer and the Chiefs to begin devising
new plots which they suggested be carried out ‘within the time frame of the
next few months.’ Among the actions
recommended was a ‘a series of well coordinated incidents to take place in and around’ the U.S. Navy
base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This
included dressing ‘friendly’ Cubans in Cuban military uniforms and then have
them ‘start riots near the main gate of the base. Others would pretend to be saboteurs inside the base. Ammunition would be blown up, fires started,
aircraft sabotaged, mortars fired at the base with damage to
installations.’” (Ibid.; p. 84.)
7.
“The suggested
operations grew progressively more outrageous.
Another called for an action similar to the infamous incident in
February 1898 when an explosion aboard the battleship Maine in Havana harbor killed 266 U.S. sailors. Although the exact cause of the explosion
remained undetermined, it sparked the Spanish-American War with Cuba. Incited by the deadly blast, more than one
million men volunteered for duty.
Lemnitzer and his generals came up with a similar plan. ‘We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo
Bay and blame Cuba,’ they proposed; ‘casualty lists in U.S. newspapers would
cause a helpful wave of national indignation.’” (Idem.)
8.
“There seemed
no limit to their fanaticism.: ‘We could develop a Communist Cuban terror
campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington,’ they wrote. ‘The terror campaign could be pointed at
Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States . . . We could sink a
boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated) . . . We could
foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.’” (Ibid.; pp. 84-85.)
9.
“Bombings were
proposed, false arrests, hijackings:
‘Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of
Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement
also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible
government.’” (Ibid.;
p. 85.)
10. “‘Advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the
Dominican [Republic] Air Force to intrusions within their national air
space. ‘Cuban’ B-26 or C-46 type
aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with ‘Cuban’ messages
to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and ‘Cuban’ shipments of
arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach. Use of MIG type aircraft by U.S. pilots
could provide additional provocation.’” (Idem.)
11. ‘Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
could appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the Government of
Cuba.’ Among the most elaborate schemes
was to ‘create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban
aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner en route from
the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to
cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba.
The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or
any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a
non-scheduled flight.’” (Idem.)
12. The broadcast details other
plans to arrange a pretext for invasion.
(Ibid.; pp. 85-86.)
13. Nonetheless, President
Kennedy’s administration rejected the plans.
“What
happened during those meetings is unknown.
But three days later, President Kennedy told Lemnitzer that there was
virtually no possibility that the U.S. would ever use overt military force in
Cuba. Undeterred, Lemnitzer and the
Chiefs persisted, virtually to the point of demanding that they be given
authority to invade and take over Cuba.”
(Ibid.; p. 87.)
14. “Within months, Lemnitzer was denied a second term as JCS
chairman and transferred to Europe as a chief of NATO. Years later, President Gerald Ford appointed
Lemnitzer, a darling of the Republican right to the President’s foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.
Lemnitzer’s Cuba chief, Brigadier General Craig, was also
transferred. Promoted to major general,
he spent three years as chief of the Army Security Agency, NSA’s military
arm.” (Ibid.; p. 88.)
15. Lemnitzer ordered his
subordinate (General Craig) to destroy the relevant communications, because he
feared an investigation. “Because of the
secrecy and illegality of Operation Northwoods, all details remained hidden for
forty years . . . With the evidence destroyed, Lemnitzer felt free to lie to
Congress. When asked, during secret
hearings before a Senate committee, if he knew of any Pentagon plans for a
direct invasion of Cuba he said he did not.
Yet detailed JCS invasion plans had been drawn up even before Kennedy
was inaugurated. And additional plans
had been developed since . . . Because so many documents were destroyed, it is
difficult to determine how many senior officials were aware of Operation
Northwoods. As has been described, the
document was signed and fully approved by Lemnitzer and the rest of the Joint
Chiefs and addressed to the Secretary of Defense for his signature.” (Ibid.; pp. 88-89.)
16. Lemnitzer’s removal as
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no effect on the continued
planning. “Even after Lemnitzer lost his job, the Joint
Chiefs kept planning ‘pretext’ operations at least into 1963. Among their proposals was a plan to
deliberately create a war between Cuba and any of a number of its Latin
American neighbors. This would give the
United States military an excuse to come in on the side of Cuba’s adversary and
get rid of Castro . . . Among the nations they suggested that the United States
secretly attack were Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago. Both were members of the British Commonwealth; thus, by secretly
attacking them and then falsely blaming Cuba, the United States could lure
England into the war against Castro.” (Ibid.;
p. 89.)
17. Paul H. Nitze (later part of
George H.W. Bush’s “team B” at the CIA) continued to propose operations in the
Northwoods vein. “In May, 1963, Assistant Secretary of
Defense Paul H. Nitze sent a plan to the White House proposing ‘a possible
scenario whereby an attack on a United States reconnaissance aircraft could be
exploited toward the end of effecting the removal of the Castro regime.’” (Ibid.; p. 89.) (For more about Nitze, see RFA#37, FTR#332.)
18. Some of Bamford’s concluding
thoughts on Northwoods are worth baring in mind. “Lemnitzer
was a dangerous—perhaps even unbalanced—right-wing extremist in an
extraordinarily sensitive position during a critical period. But Operation Northwoods also had the
support of every single member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and even senior
Pentagon official Paul Nitze argued in favor of provoking a phony war with
Cuba. The fact that the most senior members
of all the services and the Pentagon could be so out of touch with reality and
the meaning of democracy would be hidden for four decades.” (Ibid.; p. 90.) It is worth bearing this type of mentality
in mind when contemplating the apocalyptic possibilities of the contemporary
political landscape and the extremists in positions of power in the Bush
administration and the Republican Party.
(For more about Operation Northwoods, see FTR#190.)